

8 January 1974

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MEMORANDUM FOR :

SUBJECT : 5 January CIA Memorandum entitled "European Defense Cooperation, MBFR, and the Soviets"

The 5 January memo cited above was an interesting document and, to me, an enlightening one. It did, however, generate some questions as I read it. These are outlined below, and I would like to discuss them with you. Such discussion, of course, can be oral and I am not expecting any written response to this informal note.

1. Re the memo's paragraph 1, when it speaks of "the goals of MBFR negotiations" whose goals is it talking about? Those of the U.S. delegation or those of the Europeans?

2. I do not understand the parenthetical comment at the end of paragraph 2.

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3. I am not entirely clear, in connection with the memo's third paragraph, just how MBFR agreements might prejudice the already decided "development of a European Community into a European Union". Is this indeed a valid concern and, if so, is it shared by all of the nine or just by some? If it is not a valid concern, what real issues are being masked by this smoke screen?

4. In the same set of tic marks (the 3rd), how could a future European Union "take over the implementation and verification of possible agreements"? Would such a union have satellites, armies, reconnaissance airplanes?

5. On the first tic mark after "in particular", am I correct in thinking that what is really being talked about here is the "subceiling" problem? From the language of the memo I would infer that the EC participants would accept an overall ceiling on NATO theater forces

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
but would reject any partial limitations restricting the size of  
of the forces of any given country. Is this accurate?

6. I also do not quite understand "the foreign force" problem  
in the third tic mark. Presumably, the BAOR would be part of  
the overall European ceiling. Hence, how does the "foreign  
force" question arise?

7. For my information, what are the French actually doing  
to sandbag the creation of an effective European defense organiza-  
tion or, more precisely, what is it they have refused to do which  
inhibits progress in these directions?

8. I am not quite sure how "an eventual defense organization"  
is a "natural consequence of the European unity movement", unless  
you are talking about some form of regional force contributed by  
member countries but under Brussels' control. Is this indeed what  
is contemplated?

9. What is it that is really bothering the Soviets? Are they  
truly disturbed about the prospect of a unified European defense  
organization, or are they more concerned about West Germany and  
its assuming ~~as~~ a predominant or eventually controlling role in any  
West European military alliance? Perhaps both. Could the Russians  
in a sense be viewing Western Europe somewhat as the British  
viewed it throughout the better part of the 18th and 19th centuries,  
especially the latter - i.e., with the determination to prevent any  
single power from becoming militarily predominant in Europe?  
From the perspective of Whitehall, such an underlying determination  
contributed greatly to England's opposition to France in the first  
part of the 19th century and her emergent opposition to Germany in  
the latter part of the century and in the first part of the 20th century  
after Bismarck achieved German unification. I am curious whether  
the current view from the Kremlin is analogous to the view from  
Whitehall which shaped British policy for more than a century.



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